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 The Pigou-Dalton (PD) principle,
1
 applied to some type of good, recommends a non-
leaky, non-rank-switching transfer from someone with more of the good to someone with less, as 
long as no one else‘s holdings are changed— non-leaky in the sense that the one who starts out 
with less of the good gains by exactly as much as the other loses; non-rank-switching in the 
sense that the one who starts out with less does not end up with more than the other.  Here is a 
formal statement of this principle:  Let g = (g1, g2, …, gN) be a list of the holdings of good G 
among the population of N individuals, with gi  a number quantifying the holdings of any given 
individual i, and g*= (g1*, g2*, …, gN*) another such list.  If there exist two individuals h and l 
such that gh > gl, ∆ > 0, gh* = gh − ∆ ≥ gl* = gl + ∆, with gi = gi* for every other individual i in the 
population, then g* is an improvement over g. 
 In this Article, I defend the PD principle as a principle of distributive justice, with the 
relevant good responsibility-adjusted well-being. Roughly speaking, the principle I will defend 
says: if one person is at a higher level of well-being than a second, and the worse-off one is not 
responsible for being worse off, then distributive justice recommends a non-leaky, non-rank-
switching transfer of well-being from the first to the second, if no one else‘s well-being changes. 
 The PD principle has been little discussed in the philosophical literature.  This is 
surprising. The principle is the core of the economic literature on measuring inequality.  Here, 
the good is income, and economists typically take as axiomatic that an inequality metric should 
register a Pigou-Dalton transfer in income as reducing the degree of income inequality.
2
 
 Of course, there are many economic concepts that don‘t surface in philosophy, and vice 
versa.  But it‘s not as if philosophers have no interest in equality.  Nor is it that the economists 
have endorsed a principle which, after seriously philosophical reflection, seems unattractive.  
Just the opposite. The PD principle, suitably framed, is a very plausible principle of distributive 
justice—or so I shall argue.   
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 It might be objected that philosophers have widely discussed the PD principle, just with a 
different name: ―prioritarianism.‖  Prioritarians say that benefits to worse-off individuals have 
greater moral weight.  This is just to endorse the PD principle, applied to well-being, as a 
principle of morality.  
 While the PD principle (in this form) certainly is a defining commitment of 
prioritarianism, prioritarians also typically seem to embrace an additional principle—call it 
―separability‖—which is logically distinct from the PD principle, neither implying nor implied 
by it.
3
  In his seminal presentation, Derek Parfit characterizes prioritarianism as having the 
feature that the moral value of someone‘s benefit does not depend upon her position relative to 
others.
4
 The best axiomatic rendering of this feature is separability.  Although prioritarians are 
often fuzzy about the difference between the PD principle and separability, the two principles 
are distinct.    
 Further, separability is more contestable than the PD principle. While I do find 
separability to be an attractive principle of distributive justice, the case for endorsing the PD 
principle is yet stronger than the case for endorsing the combination.   This Article seeks both to 
make progress in our understanding of the structure of distributive justice, and to clarify the 
content of prioritarianism, by arguing for the PD principle while bracketing the question of 
separability.
5
 
 I defend the PD principle with reference to a particular justificatory framework for 
distributive justice: a constellation of concepts and propositions that helps to identify correct 
principles of justice, and to explain their correctness.
6
  Call this the ―benefit-claim‖ framework—
a framework adumbrated in the work of Thomas Nagel on egalitarianism. Each individual has a 
claim in favor of a distribution of goods that makes her better off; one distribution is more just 
than a second iff it more fairly accommodates everyone‘s potentially conflicting claims.  
 It would be nice if every plausible justificatory framework supported the PD principle.  
Unfortunately, I do not believe this to be true.  Two other popular frameworks are the veil-of-
ignorance framework of John Rawls and John Harsanyi; and the ―complaint‖ framework 
developed by Larry Temkin.  Neither clearly supports the PD principle. 
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 Derek Parfit, ―Equality or Priority?‖ in The Ideal of Equality, ed. Matthew Clayton and Andrew Williams 
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6
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 The strategy here, therefore, is indirect.  First, I present a powerful argument from the 
benefit-claim framework to the PD principle, suitably specified.   Second, I seek to undercut the 
two competing frameworks just mentioned, arguing that each (despite its popularity) is a 
problematic way to organize our thinking about distributive justice. 
 The topic of distributive justice has many aspects, including these:  What is the good 
whose distribution is governed by principles of justice?
7
  Do these principles govern distributions 
between individuals who are members of separate societies, or only within societies?
8
  Does 
justice apply only at the level of society‘s ―basic structure,‖ or to individuals‘ day-to-day 
choices?
9
 
 All these questions have been intensively mooted in scholarship about justice over the 
last several decades.  The question addressed in this Article has been less fully discussed:  What 
are the criteria for ranking distributions in light of justice?  A perfectly equal distribution is more 
just than an unequal distribution of the same sum total of goods; but what else can be said?
10
  
The PD principle, I suggest, is one important part of the answer to this question.  
I. The PD Principle: A Statement   
 I take it as uncontroversial that the subject of distributive justice is, at least, distributions.  
Allocation of goods (of some sort) within certain groups of individuals are assessable as more or 
less just. 
 More specifically, my discussion of distributive justice will employ the following set-up. 
Let a ―justice population‖ be some group of individuals, suitably related so that the allocation of 
goods among them is assessable as more or less just.  Let a ―good‖ be any individual attribute 
(monadic or relational) that contributes to individual well-being. Let  a ―distribution‖ among 
some justice population be a full specification of the goods held by the members of the 
population, sufficient to determine how well off each such individual is; and a full specification 
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of ―responsibility facts‖ about each member, sufficient to determine how prudently she has 
behaved.  I assume that prudence levels can be given a complete ranking.
11
   
 Let a ―justice ranking,‖ relative to some justice population, be a quasiordering (a 
transitive, possibly incomplete ranking) of distributions among that population.   The total set of 
possible distributions among a given justice population can be partitioned into a series of subsets, 
within which each individual‘s prudence level is fixed.  (That is, for each distribution within 
such a subset, individual 1 is at prudence level L1, individual 2 at level L2, etc.).   I focus 
throughout this Article on the simpler problem of how a justice ranking should order 
distributions within any such subset; the proviso that prudence levels are fixed will be implicit in 
what follows.
12
 
 The version of the PD principle about to be stated is formulated for this set-up, and for 
the case of fixed prudence.  Many other versions can be formulated; but since those variations 
are not discussed here, I can without confusion refer to this one as the ―PD principle.‖  A 
―principle of distributive justice,‖ such as the PD principle, helps to specify the justice ranking— 
by articulating sufficient conditions for two distributions to be equally just, for one to be more 
just than another, or for the two to be non-comparable with respect to justice. 
  The PD Principle 
Assume that there are two distributions d and d*, and two members of the population 
(call them ―High‖ and ―Low‖), which satisfy the following three conditions. 
 (1) The Level Condition.  In d, High is better off than Low.  In d*, High is at least as well 
off as Low.     
 (2) The Delta Condition.   High is better off in d than d*, while Low is better off in d* 
than d, and the difference in High‘s well-being between the two distributions is exactly 
equal to the difference in Low‘s well-being. 
 (3)  The Responsibility Condition.  High and Low behave equally prudently in d and d*, 
and this prudence level is sufficiently high.   
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 Consider the set P of possible pairings of individuals and distributions, i.e., the product set of the justice 
population and the set of distributions.  Assume that, for any two such pairings, either the first individual in the first 
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 The simplifying assumption of a complete ranking of prudence levels, in turn, allows us to partition the set 
of distributions into a series of mutually exclusive subsets, within each of which any given individual is at a fixed 
prudence level.  
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just. This Article focuses on the simpler question:  to what degree would various arrangements of goods among a 
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prudence? 
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 Moreover, the following condition is true of every other individual in the justice 
population.  (As a shorthand, I will say that someone is ―unaffected‖ by two distributions 
if she is equally well off in each, and ―affected‖ if this is not the case.) 
 (4) The Others Unaffected Condition.  Everyone else in the population is equally well off 
in d* as in d. 
 Then: Distribution d* is more just than d. 
 When are individuals ―suitably related‖ to be governed by distributive justice?  What 
does it take for a group of individuals to be a ―justice population?‖  The set-up just presented, 
and the defense of the PD principle about to be put forward, are agnostic on this issue. 
This set-up and defense are also agnostic about the kinds of choices to which principles 
of justice apply: individuals‘ day-to-day choices, choices with respect to a society‘s ―basic 
structure,‖ etc.  Some choice situations, at least, are governed by distributive justice; and the 
justice ranking of distributions, in turn, will help fix what justice does require in such situations. 
 The reader will note that a distribution is a full specification of the characteristics of a 
justice population, sufficient to determine how well off they are and how responsibly (prudently) 
they‘ve behaved.  A distribution is not quite a possible world.  There will be multiple worlds 
compatible with a given distribution: a set of worlds any one of which could possibly obtain, if 
the distribution were to.   However, those worlds will differ only with respect to facts that are 
irrelevant to both well-being and prudence. Any given individual will be equally well off in all of 
the worlds compatible with a distribution, and will have behaved equally prudently.  
 My set-up employs ―distributions‖ with this full-specification property so as to avoid 
difficult questions regarding the application of the PD principle under conditions of risk and 
uncertainty.
13
  However, given the bounded capacities of the human mind, such ―distributions‖ 
are cognitively intractable objects for human agents.  A human mind is not able to store an 
explicit representation of a distribution.   
 The topic addressed here therefore concerns criteria of rightness rather than decision 
procedures for humans.  In particular, I am asking: what are the criteria of rightness, in light of 
distributive justice, for one kind of object to which criteria of justice are applicable, namely fully 
specified distributions?  Once we have seen (as I hope to demonstrate) that the PD principle 
figures among the criteria of justice for fully specified distributions, we can then engage related 
topics:  What are the criteria of rightness for choices governed by distributive justice, or for 
incompletely specified distributions?  Insofar as these objects correspond to probability 
distributions across fully specified distributions, does the PD principle govern their ranking in an 
―ex post‖ or ―ex ante‖ manner?  These question, in turn, are different from this one: what role 
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does the PD principle play in the decision procedures that cognitively bounded agents ought to 
employ in making those choices that are subject to the requirements of justice? 
 These latter topics, although vitally important, are placed to one side.  It will be progress 
enough to show that the PD principle states a sufficient condition for one fully specified 
distribution (I henceforth drop  the phrase ―fully specified,‖ which is implied) to be more just 
than a second. 
 The PD principle, if indeed a true principle of justice, may well help to justify additional 
principles—in particular, additional principles governing transfers.  For example, the PD 
principle together with a plausible principle of ―Anonymity‖ entails an expanded PD principle—
endorsing a non-leaky transfer that may be rank-switching but is gap-diminishing.
14
  A different 
kind of expanded PD principle broadens the Responsibility Condition so that Low is either 
equally prudent as High or more prudent. The PD principle may also help to justify transfer 
principles concerning leaky transfers—stating conditions under which improving a worse-off 
person‘s welfare by less than is lost by a better-off person yields a more just distribution.  
 Thus the PD principle is certainly not a necessary condition for one distribution to be 
more just than a second.  Rather it is a sufficient condition—or so I argue here.  
 While my defense of that principle is agnostic about various questions that I have just 
described, it is not agnostic about the ―currency‖ for distributive justice.   I take that currency to 
be responsibility-adjusted well-being
15—not primary goods, resources, midfare, or capabilities, 
to name the obvious competitors.  ―Goods‖ are defined as attributes constitutive of well-being.  
The Level Condition and Delta Condition are expressed in terms of the well-being levels of High 
and Low, and changes in their well-being, and not in terms of their levels of primary goods, 
resources, midfare, capabilities, etc.   Moreover, the ―currency‖ for the set-up and principle is 
obviously responsibility-adjusted welfare, not welfare simpliciter.  The PD principle does not 
make the combination of the Level, Delta, and Others Unaffected Conditions sufficient for d* to 
be more just than d.   Those conditions are only jointly sufficient for that consequence together 
with the Responsibility Condition. 
 The discussion here will not reshash the ―equality of what‖ debate, but instead will 
presuppose that ―responsibility-adjusted well-being‖ wins that debate.  In showing how 
principles of distributive justice flow from the pattern of individuals‘ benefit claims, and how the 
strength of such claims can readily be grounded in facts about individuals‘ welfare and 
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 The expanded PD principle uses a different version of the Level Condition: High is better off than Low in d, and 
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+
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responsibility, the discussion buttresses existing arguments for that ―currency‖; but no attempt 
will be made to recapitulate those arguments. 
 But what of readers who prefer primary goods, capabilities, midfare, resources, etc.?   Is 
there a version of the PD principle that they should embrace?  This is an important question—the 
―equality of what?‖ debate remains a debate—but not one I will attempt to address.  One worry 
about the PD principle as a generic, currency-independent principle of distributive justice has to 
do with the Pareto principle. My defense of the PD principle (the version just presented) will rely 
upon the Pareto principle.  But the PD principle, in some non-welfare currencies, conflicts with 
that principle.
16
  
II. Why Endorse the PD Principle? The Benefit-Claim Framework 
 Why believe that the PD principle is true?  Here, I draw upon Thomas Nagel‘s critique of 
utilitarianism and defense of what he terms an ―egalitarian priority system.‖ In his 1977 Tanner 
Lecture, he writes: 
[An egalitarian priority system, unlike utilitarianism] does not combine all points of view by a majoritarian 
method.  Instead, it establishes an order of priority among needs and gives preference to the most urgent, 
regardless of numbers. . . . 
 One problem in the development of this idea is the definition of the order of priority: whether a single, 
objective standard of urgency should be used in construing the claims of each person, or whether his 
interests should be ranked at his own estimation of their relative importance.  In addition to the question of 
objectivity, there is a question of [temporal] scale … 
 But let me leave these questions aside. The essential feature of an egalitarian priority system is that it 
counts improvements to the welfare of the worse off as more urgent than improvements to the welfare of 
the better off.  These other questions must be answered to decide who is worse off and who is better off, 
and how much, but what makes a system egalitarian is the priority it gives to the claims of those whose 
overall life prospects put them at the bottom,  irrespective of numbers or of overall utility.  Each individual 
with a more urgent claim has priority, in the simplest version of such a view, over each individual with a 
less urgent claim.  The moral equality of egalitarianism consists in taking into account the interests of each 
person, subject to the same system of priorities of urgency, in determining what would be best overall.
17
 
In Equality and Partiality, Nagel writes: 
 [I]mpartiality generates a greater interest in benefitting the worse off than in benefitting the better off—a 
kind of priority to the former over the latter. . . .  
 
[Individualized impartial concern] does not rule out all ranking of alternatives involving different persons, 
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nor does it mean that benefitting more people is not in itself preferable to benefitting fewer. But it does 
introduce a significant element of non-aggregative, pairwise comparison between the persons affected by 
any choice or policy. … The claims on our impartial concern of an individual who is badly off present 
themselves as having some priority over the claims of each individual who is better off: as being ahead in 
the queue, so to speak.
18
 
Several key ideas animate these passages.  First, the egalitarian ranking of outcomes is 
determined by the totality of individuals‘ ―claims‖ (a word Nagel uses repeatedly).  Second, what 
each individual can claim is an ―improvement‖ in her well-being—that she be ―benefitted.‖  
Third, individuals who are worse off have stronger claims.  Nagel also suggests, fourth, that 
alternatives are to be compared in a ―non-aggregative‖ manner, by pairwise comparison between 
claims even when more than two individuals have claims; but this further suggestion will not 
figure in my defense of the PD principle. 
Drawing to begin upon the first two ideas, I suggest the following framework—the 
―benefit-claim‖ framework—for grounding principles of distributive justice.  A claim is a 
relation between an individual and two distributions.  Any claim has a valence: it is either a zero 
claim, or a claim in favor of one distribution over the other.
19
   Every non-zero claim also has a 
strength.  The ranking of two distributions is determined by some rule (aggregative or not) for 
comparing the number and strength of non-zero claims in favor of the first distribution, with the 
number and strength of non-zero claims in favor of the second. 
Many different rules for assigning claim valence and strength can be imagined.  I assume, 
to start, only that a well-being difference is a necessary if perhaps not sufficient condition for a 
non-zero claim. If Sue is equally well off in d and d*, how could it be unfair to her if one 
distribution rather than the other obtained?
20
  
The argument from the benefit-claim framework (with this proviso about valence), to the 
PD principle, is straightforward.   To begin, High surely has a non-zero claim in favor of d over 
d*.  After all, High is better off in d than d*.  Now, if High‘s behavior in one or both 
distributions had been badly imprudent, we might assign him a zero claim despite this well-being 
difference.  We might, in that case, say that distributive justice is indifferent to welfare effects on 
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valence. 
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someone so irresponsible. But one aspect of the Responsibility Condition is that High is 
sufficiently prudent in both d and d*.   At a minimum, if High is perfectly prudent in both 
distributions, then it would be problematic for an account of distributive justice to give no role to 
High‘s interests in the determination of whether d or d* is more just.  The level of ―sufficient 
prudence‖ might be at the level of perfect prudence, or lower, all the way down to maximal 
imprudence; nothing here hinges upon where it is set. 
Parallel reasoning shows that Low has a non-zero claim in favor of d* over d. 
Moreover, because everyone else is equally well off in d and d* (the Others Unaffected 
condition), everyone else has zero claims.  Thus we have a two-person case, in which one person 
(High) has a non-zero claim in favor of d, and another (Low) a non-zero claim in favor of d*. 
Who has the stronger claim?  Nagel suggests, I have noted, that worse-off individuals 
have comparatively stronger claims. (―Improvements to the welfare of the worse off [are] more 
urgent than improvements to the welfare of the better off.‖21)  Very plausibly, this is true in a 
weak, pro tanto form. If no other factors determinative of claim strength count the other way, 
then: if Sam would be better off than Sheila, regardless of which distribution obtains, then Sheila 
has a stronger claim between the distributions than Sam.  Extending this slightly, it seems very 
plausible to endorse the following rule for assigning claim strength. 
The Pro Tanto Well-Being-Level Rule for Claim Strength:  If one individual is better off 
than a second in distribution d
+
, and either better off than or equally well off as the 
second in distribution d
++
, then—-if no other considerations relevant to claim strength 
count the other way—the first individual has a weaker claim between d+ and d++ than the 
second individual. 
 Various additional factors may determine the strength of an individual‘s claim between 
two distributions, potentially including: her well-being difference between the two; how 
prudently she and others behave in each; the overall pattern of well-being in each.  The pro tanto 
rule just stated merely says that, where no other such factors are overriding, the first individual 
has a weaker claim between the distributions than the second. 
 But consider the case of two distributions d and d* satisfying the conditions of the PD 
principle.  Because Low is worse off than High in d, and worse off or equally well off in d*, her 
pro tanto claim between the two is stronger than High‘s.  Moreover, those conditions ensure that  
no other factors operate to yield a stronger all-things-considered claim for High than Low.   By 
virtue of the Delta Condition, High‘s well-being difference between d and d* is exactly equal to 
Low‘s well-being difference between d* and d.   In a different case, if High had sufficiently 
more to gain than Low to lose, High might plausibly argue that the distribution which makes him 
better off is on balance the fairer distribution.  But he can hardly make such an argument here.  
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The Responsibility Condition states that High and Low are not merely sufficiently, but 
also equally, prudent.   Arguably, as between two individuals both of whom are affected by two 
distributions—and both of whom are sufficiently prudent to have non-zero claims—
considerations of comparative fault should influence the comparative strength of their claims.  
For example, imagine that normal prudence is sufficient, and that Normal behaves at that level, 
while Perfect is perfectly prudent.  In one distribution, Perfect is worse off than Normal; in a 
second, they swap places; no one else is affected.  In such a case, even though the well-being 
levels are symmetrical and the differences equal, wouldn‘t Perfect have stronger grounds for 
complaint if the first distribution were to obtain, then Normal would if the second were?    
However, in the case at hand, even if Low falls short of perfect prudence, High does so to 
an equal extent. Thus, considerations of comparative fault do not vitiate the pro tanto case for a 
stronger claim that Low has in virtue of being at a lower well-being level than High.  
Finally, it is important to note that the argument presented here for the PD principle does 
not deny the potential relevance, for purposes of determining someone‘s claim strength, of the 
overall pattern of well-being levels in each of the two distributions.  (We will return to this 
observation in the discussion, in Part IV, of separability.)   But because High is better off than 
Low in d, it follows of course that High‘s rank in the distribution of well-being in d is higher 
than Low‘s rank in d:  the  number of individuals who are worse off than High in d is greater (by 
at least one) than the number of individuals who are worse off than Low in d.  And High‘s well-
being rank in d* is either greater than or equal to Low‘s well-being rank in d*. While a pro tanto 
rule giving a stronger claim to a higher-ranked person is possible, such a rule would be perverse. 
Either someone‘s position in the overall pattern of well-being makes no difference to her claim 
strength; or the fact that she has a higher position should tend to make her claim weaker.  
In line with a standard analysis, the Responsibility Condition points to facts about High‘s 
and Low‘s prudence.22  Some have suggested that individuals can be differentially prudent but 
equally responsible for purposes of distributive justice, or vice versa.  For example, Todd focuses 
like a laser beam on his own interests, while Teresa works tirelessly to advance distributive 
justice itself, sacrificing her own welfare.  Slack is as heedless of his own welfare as Teresa, but 
for no good reason.  All have ended up badly off; we can choose to benefit one.  Wouldn‘t it be 
at least as fair to benefit Teresa as Todd, and fairer than to benefit Slack? 
For the reader worried by this sort of example, it should be noted that the Responsibility 
Condition can be rendered more generic.  High and Low are at an equal level of ―effort,‖ where 
―effort‖ means an individual‘s rationality in pursuit of some admissible mixture of goals, 
                                                 
22
 Arneson, ―Welfare Should be the Currency of Justice,‖ 506-08; Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen, ―Luck Egalitarianism: 
Faults and Collective Choice,‖ Economics and Philosophy 27 (2011): 151-73, 169 (noting that ―[t]he default view of 
faults [for luck egalitarians] is the view that the relevant evaluative standard is prudence, i.e., whether the agent 
conducts herself in a way that is relevantly worse than optimal from the point of view of the agent‘s self-interest‖). 
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including self-interest, moral goals, and perhaps others.
23
  However, for concreteness I will stick 
with the Responsibility Condition as stated and analyze ―effort‖ in terms of prudence. 
III. Why the Benefit-Claim Framework? 
 Recall that a justificatory framework (for distributive justice) is a constellation of 
concepts and propositions that helps to identify correct principle of distributive justice. The 
benefit-claim approach is one plausible such framework, and it supports the PD principle.  But 
other seemingly plausible justificatory frameworks do not—as the discussion to follow will 
show.   While (as mentioned) economists studying inequality take the PD principle as 
foundational—and indeed I believe they are correct to do so—the defense of the PD principle is 
by no means trivial.  
A full defense of that principle would seek to undercut every justificatory framework that 
fails to support it.  That, of course, is well beyond the scope of this Article.  Rather, I criticize 
two popular, competing frameworks: the veil-of-ignorance approach, and Temkin‘s complaint 
framework.
24
    The fact that a candidate framework fails to support intuitively compelling 
principles of distributive justice makes it difficult for the deliberator about justice to endorse the 
framework, in reflective equilibrium.  But the veil-of-ignorance framework has difficulty 
supporting a principle of Minimal Preference for Equality, while Temkin‘s framework has 
difficulty supporting the Minimal Pareto Principle.  The benefit-claim framework supports both. 
 A. The Veil of Ignorance 
 While Rawls, of course, proposes principles of justice to be applied to the distribution of 
primary goods—not well-being—the welfarist can certainly appropriate the veil-of-ignorance 
framework by appeal to which Rawls justifies those principles.  Define distributions as above, 
and consider the simple case where the subset of distributions being ranked is such that 
everyone‘s (fixed) level of prudence is equal.   In such a case, on the responsibility-sensitive 
welfarist construal of the veil of ignorance, one distribution is more just than a second iff each  
member of the justice population (or her guardian angel)
25—under an appropriate condition of 
ignorance concerning which attribute bundle she has, and choosing rationally—prefers the first. 
                                                 
23
 See Lippert-Rasmussen, ―Luck-Egalitarianism,‖ 169-72.  The formal literature on responsibility-sensitive 
egalitarianism adjusts for individual ―effort,‖ without any particular substantive commitment about its content.  See, 
e.g., John Roemer, Equality of Opportunity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998). 
24
 A third competitor is Tim Scanlon‘s contractualism, whereby moral principles are those that individuals lack 
reason to reject. T.M. Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998). But 
Scanlon stresses that an individual‘s reasons transcend her well-being, and thus his framework seems a poor basis 
for grounding principles of justice with a welfarist currency.  Conversely, if the framework is adapted for this 
context by restricting a contractor‘s reasons to her own well-being, it seems little different from the benefit-claim 
approach.   
25
 Recall that we are developing criteria of rightness for fully specified distributions, and considering justificatory 
frameworks adapted to this problem.  Because members of the justice population (if humans) will lack the cognitive 
resources to think in full detail about a distribution, the veil-of-ignorance framework should probably be formulated 
12 
 
 Surely the justice ranking of distributions should satisfy a principle of Minimal 
Preference for Equality:  
Minimal Preference for Equality:  Assume that distributions d
+
 and d
++
 are such that: (1) 
Total well-being (the sum total of individual well-being) is the same in both distributions.  
(2) In d
++
, everyone is equally well off, while that is not true in d
+.
  (3) Everyone is 
sufficiently prudent and equally prudent.  Then d
++
 is more just than d
+
. 
The veil-of-ignorance framework, under a very plausible plausible construal of an ―appropriate 
condition of ignorance,‖ does not support this principle  
 Rawls argues that the veil should involve nonprobabilistic ignorance (―NI‖).26  If the veil 
in the context at hand is specified as an NI veil, then each member of the justice population 
compares the distributions without knowing which bundle of goods she will receive, and without 
assigning a probability (or even set of probabilities) to each given bundle.  A maximin rule for 
rational choice under NI, combined with such a veil, will yield a maximin rule for ordering 
distributions—in turn satisfying Minimal Preference for Equality.   
 But Rawls‘ case for NI is hardly compelling.  John Harsanyi and, more recently, Derek 
Parfit have argued that an equiprobabilist construal of the veil of ignorance (―EI‖) is at least as 
plausible as NI.
27
   If there are N members of the population and thus each distribution allocates 
N bundles of goods to these persons, each individual—behind the EI veil—would view a given 
distribution as a 1/N chance of the first bundle, a 1/N chance of the second, etc.  The best case for 
EI does not rely on a dogmatic Bayesianism, which says that rational individuals can always 
assign precise probabilities to the upshots of their choices, hence are never operating under NI.  
It allows that NI may be consistent, in some cases, with the dictates of rationality—but denies 
that NI provides the best interpretation of what ―ignorance‖ is supposed to do as an element of a 
hypothetical choice procedure for arriving at principles of justice. The veil of ignorance is an 
imagined scenario, constructed by moral deliberators so as to enable clearer thought about the 
requirements of justice; the deliberator can stipulate that each bundle has precise probabilities, 
and can stipulate what they are.  Moreover, ignorance is supposed to operationalize the 
separateness of persons—that each person‘s interests have a distinct and equal role in 
determining a just allocation.  Why isn‘t such separateness best operationalized via EI, which 
tells the chooser behind the veil of ignorance to give equal—not unknown—weight to the 
possibility of each bundle? 
                                                                                                                                                             
in terms of a population of angelic (cognitively unbounded) advisers each caring about the interests of one member 
of the justice population.  Since I am arguing against the veil-of-ignorance framework, I do not pursue this issue; the 
framework is problematic for quite a different reason, namely its failure to endorse Minimal Preference for Equality. 
26
 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, rev. ed. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), 118-23, 130-53. 
27
 John Harsanyi, Rational Behavior and Bargaining Equilibrium in Games and Social Situations (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1986), ch. 4; ―Morality and the Theory of Rational Behavior,‖ in Utilitarianism and 
Beyond, ed. Amartya Sen and Bernard Williams (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982); Derek Parfit, On 
What Matters (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), vol. 1, 350-51. 
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 Does EI support Minimal Preference for Equality?  Some have suggested that rational 
individuals, choosing with known probabilities, may be required—required as a matter of 
rationality—to be risk-neutral in well-being.28 This means, first, that there is a well-being 
function w(.), representing the well-being levels of different attribute bundles, and well-being 
differences between them; and, second, that lotteries over bundles are ranked according to the 
mathematical expectation of w(.).   A little less formally, this means indifference between a 
choice yielding a particular level of well-being with certainty, and any choice whose expected 
well-being value is that particular level.  EI, together with this conception of rationality, clearly 
violates Minimal Preference for Equality.  EI plus risk neutrality implies that each individual 
ranks distributions according to the average w(.) value of the component bundles—the average 
such value, since each bundle has an equal probability.  But d
+
 and d
++
, as described by Minimal 
Preference for Equality, have the same average w(.) value.  d
++
 is a perfect equalization of the 
same sum total of well-being that is attained, unequally, in d
+
. 
 To be sure, it is hardly compelling that rationality requires risk neutrality in well-being.  
Moreover, if that putative requirement is replaced with a different one—namely, that rationality 
requires risk aversion in well-being—the veil of ignorance plus EI will be consistent with 
Minimal Preference for Equality.  Informally, risk aversion in well-being means caring more 
about the downside risk of low well-being levels, than the upside chance of high levels. 
Distribution d
+
 (understood as an equiprobabilty distribution over bundles) offers both upside 
and downside risks, relative to d
++
.   And because the two distributions have the same expected 
well-being value, the downside risks outweigh the upside chances for any risk-averse chooser 
and incline her towards d
++
.
29
   
 But seeing rationality as requiring risk aversion in well-being is no more plausible than 
seeing it as requiring risk neutrality.   The latter requirement errs, if it does, by precluding a 
diversity of rational risk attitudes.  If it is rationally permissible to prefer chocolate or vanilla, 
why not to be risk-neutral, -averse, or risk prone in well-being?   Yet shifting from a rational 
requirement of risk neutrality in well-being, to a rational permission to adopt other risk attitudes, 
does not salvage the compatibility of the EI veil of ignorance with Minimal Preference for 
Equality.   Assume that risk neutrality in well-being is one of the permissible risk attitudes (as 
surely it should be).  If there is a population of individuals, at least one of whose members has 
this attitude, then that individual will be indifferent between d
+
 and d
++
, and this will be 
rationally permitted.  Given a plausible specification of the veil-of-ignorance framework for the 
case where individuals behind the veil have divergent evaluations of the distributions at issue, 
                                                 
28
 John Broome considers such a requirement, which he calls ―Bernoulli‘s hypothesis,‖ in Weighing Goods (Oxford: 
Basil Blackwell, 1995). See also Mattias Risse, ―Harsanyi‘s ‗Utilitarian Theorem‘ and Utilitarianism,‖ Nous 36 
(2002): 550-77. 
29
 More formally, risk-aversion in well-being means maximizing the expectation of f(w), where w is the well-being 
level of a bundle as assigned by the w(.) function, and f(.) is strictly concave.  By Jensen‘s Inequality, someone who 
sees d
++
 and d
+
 as 1/N probabilities of their component bundles, and maximizes f(w), will prefer d
++
. 
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the upshot will be that d
+ 
and d
++
 are incomparably just.
30
  But, surely, d
++
 is more just than d
+—
not incomparably just. 
 But why seek to undercut the veil-of-ignorance framework?  Unfortunately, the veil of 
ignorance, at least on the EI construal, does not support the PD principle, for the same reason 
that it does not support Minimal Preference for Equality.  A risk neutral deliberator behind the 
veil would be indifferent between a 1/N chance of being High in d and a 1/N chance of being 
Low in d (plus a 1-2/N chance of being anyone else in the population in d), as compared to a 1/N 
chance of being High in d* and 1/N chance of being Low in d* (plus a 1 – 2/N chance of being 
anyone else in the population in d*). 
 Conversely, a famous theorem of Hardy, Littlewood, and Polya shows that any unequal 
distribution of some fixed total of a good can be transformed into a perfectly equal distribution 
via a series of Pigou-Dalton transfers.
31
  Thus the benefit-claim framework, if it supports the PD 
transfer (as I‘ve argued it does), also supports Minimal Preference for Equality.  
 B. Temkin‘s Framework  
 In his influential book, Inequality, and subsequent writings, Larry Temkin has argued for 
the moral importance of ―comparative fairness‖32:  ―[C]oncern about equality is a portion of our 
concern about fairness that focuses on how people fare relative to others .... Egalitarians in my 
sense generally believe that is bad for some to be worse off than others through no fault or choice 
of their own.‖33 
 Temkin discusses in detail how ―comparative fairness‖ might be fleshed out as a criterion 
for ranking outcomes, as a function of individual well-being
34
 and facts about individual 
responsibility. The ranking of outcomes is determined by individual ―complaints.‖  Temkin‘s 
analysis of these ―complaints‖ focuses on the simple case where individuals are not differentially 
                                                 
30
 On this specification, d
++
 is at least as just as d
+
 iff all members of the population, behind the veil, weakly prefer 
d
++
.  This approach has the virtues of giving equal weight to the preferences of all members of the justice population, 
and of yielding a transitive (if incomplete) ranking of distributions. 
31
 See Albert Marshall and Ingram Olkin, Inequalities: Theory of Majorization and its Applications (New York: 
Academic Press, 1979), 21-22.  The Hardy/Littlewood/Polya result is much more general, linking PD transfers and 
Lorenz dominance.  To see why the proposition in the text is true: Let g be a list of the holdings of some good 
distributed unequally among the members of a finite population. Let U(g) be the number of individuals whose 
holdings are not at the average level.  There must be at least one below the average and one above. Pick any such 
pair, and let ∆ be the lesser of the distance from the average to their two levels. Arrange a PD transfer of ∆ between 
them, yielding g*.  Note that U(g*) is smaller (by a value of one or two) than U(g).  If this process is repeated, it 
must in a finite number of steps yield a vector with a U value of zero, i.e., perfect equality. 
32
 ―Equality, Priority, or What?‖ Economics and Philosophy 19 (2003): 61-87, 62. 
33
  Ibid.  The book is Inequality (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996)   See also Temkin‘s ―Equality, Priority, 
and the Levelling Down Objection‖ and ―Egalitarianism Defended,‖ Ethics 113 (2003): 764-82. Temkin does not 
use the term ―comparative fairness‖ in Inequality, but the book is clearly focused on what he later comes to denote 
by that term.  See Inequality, 13. 
34
 ―Throughout this work I shall mainly discuss inequality of welfare.‖  Inequality, 10. 
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responsible for their well-being levels.
35
 In this case, whether someone has a complaint in a 
given outcome depends on her welfare level and the number and welfare levels of individuals 
who are better- and worse off than her.  
 Temkin considers different possibilities for identifying those who have complaints; for 
measuring the complaints‘ strength; and for comparing two outcomes in light of the pattern of 
complaints in each.  One possibility is that each person in outcome x who is below the mean 
level of well-being in x has a complaint in x; another, that each person in x other than the best-off 
person has a complaint in x; a third, that each person in x other than the best-off person has one 
or more complaints in x, one for each of the persons better off than him. The strength of 
individual complaints might be measured in a linear or non-linear manner. Finally, one possible 
approach outlined by Temkin for comparing x and y in light of the patterns of complaints in each 
outcome is aggregative: x is fairer than y iff the total sum of complaints (or weighted complaints) 
in x is smaller than the total sum of complaints (or weighted complaints) in y.   But Temkin also 
describes a non-aggregative, ―maximin‖ rule for comparing two outcomes, namely: x is fairer 
than y iff the largest complaint in x is smaller than the largest complaint in y.
36
   
 It seems no gross distortion of Temkin‘s account to see ―comparative fairness‖ as a 
potential conception of distributive justice
37
; and to adapt his model of ―complaints‖ to the 
specific set-up described earlier.  Thus adapted, Temkin‘s framework says: For a given 
distribution d
+
, an individual has zero, one, or more complaints. The number of her complaints 
and their strength potentially depends upon all the various features of d
+
, including her well-
being level, the levels of other persons, and how prudently she and they behave.  In turn, whether 
d
+
 is more just than d
++
 depends upon the number and strength of complaints in d
+
, and the 
number and strength of complaints in d
++
.  
 This ―complaint‖ framework has both interesting similarities to, and critical differences 
from, the benefit-claim approach.  A ―claim,‖ in the generic sense, is something about some 
particular person that is identified by a justificatory framework, and serves to organize thinking 
about distributive justice.  This is a very natural device for deliberating about justice, and indeed 
both the benefit-claim and complaint frameworks employ that device.   A Temkin-style 
―complaint‖ is one kind of ―claim‖; a Nagel-style benefit-claim is also one kind of ―claim.‖  But 
they differ, critically, in their structure.  A Temkin-style ―complaint‖ is a claim that takes the 
form of a relation between one person and one distribution; by contrast, a benefit-claim takes the 
form of a relation between one person and two distributions.   
 To say that some person (Sue, say) has a Temkin-style ―complaint‖ is, more precisely, to 
identify one distribution d
+
 and say: were d
+
 to obtain, Sue would have a justified complaint, of a 
                                                 
35
 ―[F]or each of this book‘s examples I shall assume that people are equally skilled, hardworking, morally worthy, 
and so forth, so that those who are worse off than others are so through no fault of their own.‖ Ibid., 17. 
36
 See in particular Inequality, ch. 2, and also ch. 6 for a discussion of a non-linear measure of complaint strength.  
37
 See, e.g., Inequality, 13. 
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certain strength, that d
+
 is unfair to her.  Thus, it is perfectly coherent to say, of two distributions, 
that Sue‘s complaints in one are stronger than her complaints in the second.  By contrast, it 
would be incoherent to say that Sue has stronger benefit-claims in one distribution than a second.  
Rather, the structure of a benefit-claim is that it compares distributions from the perspective of 
one individual, giving her a claim of some strength in favor of one or other.    
 As a shorthand, we might say that a Temkin-style ―complaint‖ has a ―within distribution‖ 
structure, since it is a relation that embeds one distribution; while a benefit-claim has an ―across-
distribution‖ structure, since it embeds two distributions. 
 These divergent blueprints for the structure of claims, within-distribution versus across-
distribution, are not only reasonably faithful adaptations (I believe) of Temkin‘s and Nagel‘s 
scholarship.  They also correspond to divergent strands in ordinary discourse about fairness.   
Sometimes it is said to be fairest to reserve some decision, between two alternative courses of 
action, to those who are ―affected‖ by it.  Others need have no say, because they have no stake in 
the matter.  This is to express an across-distribution view of claims: someone‘s claim, if she has 
it, will be a claim for one alternative over another, and she will have such a claim only if 
affected, i.e., better off with one rather than the other alternative.   
 However, sometimes those who are worse off than others are heard to complain that this 
inequality is unfair. The complaint is about the one outcome (here, the actual outcome) in which 
the inequality occurs.  The worse-off are identifying a feature of the actual outcome (that there 
are others betters off than them) which counts against it in a fairness comparison with any 
alternative, rather than identifying one particular counterfactual outcome relative to which they 
have grounds for complaint.  This is to express a within-distribution view of claims.  
 This difference between the benefit-claim and ―complaint‖ frameworks is not merely 
expositional: a matter of two alternative ―stories‖ for the very same ranking of distributions in 
light of distributive justice.  To start, it is far from clear whether the complaint framework 
supports the PD principle.  Consider any case in which d and d* meet the conditions stated by 
the PD principle, but Low is not the worst off person in these distributions.  There are some 
individuals who are worse off than Low in d, and hence in d*. Because High and perhaps others 
are better off than Low in d, she (Low) may well have complaints in d; and the number and/or 
strength of Low‘s complaints may well diminish in d*, since the difference between Low‘s 
welfare level and these individuals‘ diminishes in d*.  However, if Low has complaints in d, then 
surely also do the individuals in d who are worse off than Low (at least if they are equally or 
more prudent than Low and High).  And these persons‘ complaints in d* could increase in their 
number and/or strength; Low has become yet better off than them, and although High‘s welfare 
has decreased, he remains no closer to them than Low.   Why believe that the most attractive 
specification of the ―complaint‖ approach will necessarily identify d* as more just?   
17 
 
 Temkin himself has stated that the PD principle needs ―serious modification,‖ writing:  
―[I]f the consequence of altering the gap between A and B is that the gaps between A and B and 
other groups are also altered, … the net effect of such a transfer [on inequality] would depend, at 
least in part, on both the size and the number of all the different increases and decreases.‖38 In 
the margin, I show that some (if not all) of the methods outlined by Temkin for identifying 
complaints, measuring their strength, and comparing outcomes in light of their pattern can 
indeed lead to violations of the PD principle.
39
 
 I would be delighted to be wrong about this—to be shown that the ―complaint‖ 
framework supports the PD principle.  (Defending the principle, not criticizing the framework, is 
the chief aim of this Article.)  But if the ―complaint‖ framework does not support the PD 
principle, then—in order to defend that principle—we need to undercut the framework.  Minimal 
Preference for Equality here offers no help, since the ―complaint‖ framework surely supports 
it.
40
  Rather, I will appeal to a weak version of the Pareto principle, which runs as follows. 
 
                                                 
38
 Inequality, 83-84. There is also a subliterature on inequality metrics that fail to satisfy the PD principle—
scholarship that is inspired, in part, by Temkin‘s notion of complaints.   See Chakravarty, Inequality, Polarization 
and Poverty, ch. 3. 
39
 As mentioned, Temkin considers three possibilities with respect to identifying complaints, each with a 
corresponding reference level of well-being, in turn used to establish the strength (or equivalently, ―size‖) of 
complaints: (I) that everyone below the mean has one complaint (the reference level here is the mean); (II) that each 
person except the best off person has a complaint (the best-off person is now the reference level); and (III) that each 
person except the best off person has one or more complaints, namely one against each person better off than him 
(the reference level is each such person).  In the initial chapters of Inequality, Temkin assumes that the strength of 
the complaint is just the difference between the reference level and the complainant‘s well-being.  Finally, he 
mentions four possibilities for comparing two outcomes in light of the pattern of complaints (for short, a ―patterning 
rule‖): additive, weighted additive (specifically, giving more weight to those with larger complaints), maximin, or a 
leximin variation on maximin (comparing the largest complaint in x to the largest in y, if those are equal the second-
largest to the second-largest; etc.).   It should be noted that a simple way to accomplish the weighted additive rule is 
to sum a convex transformation of the complaints.  
  
 It is clear that Possibility I in all variations violates PD: no one above the mean has complaints, and 
because the mean is the reference level PD transfers between individuals above the mean have no effect on the 
number or size of complaints.   Possibility II violates PD with an additive patterning rule.  For example, if we move 
from (10, 20, 100) to (15, 15, 100), the sum of complaints is 170 in both cases.  Possibility II also violates PD with a 
maximin patterning rule: a PD transfer between individuals who are not worst off does not change the magnitude of 
the largest complaint.  However, it can be shown that Possibility II with a leximin patterning rule, or summing a 
convex transformation of complaints, will satisfy the PD principle. 
 
 Possibility III is the most favorable for the PD principle.  This approach even with an additive patterning 
rule satisfies PD, and also does summing a convex transformation, or leximinning complaints.  It does not with a 
maximin rule. 
 
 Later, in chapter 6 of Inequality, Temkin argues that the difference rule for measuring the strength of 
complaints needs modification, but does not offer a concrete proposal for doing so.  Regardless, Possibility I in all 
variants will continue to violate the PD principle with respect to transfers above the mean (unless such transfers, 
even though mean-preserving, somehow change the strength of complaints held by those below the mean).  And all 
possibilities coupled with the maximin patterning rule will violate the PD principle. 
40
 This is true for reasons discussed several paragraphs below in the analysis of the Minimal Pareto Principle.  
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Minimal Pareto Principle.  Let d
+
 and d
++
 be such that everyone is better off in d
++
 than 
d
+
, and everyone is sufficiently prudent.  Then: d
++
 is more just than d
+
. 
The term ―Pareto‖ is sometimes used to name a principle concerning preferences, sometimes a 
principle about well-being.  The version of the Pareto principle just expressed is the latter sort.   
It is weak in three ways.  First, unlike the so-called ―strong‖ Pareto principle (in terms of well-
being) which comes into play when some are better off with one alternative and everyone else is 
at least as well off, the Minimal Pareto Principle constrains the ranking of distributions only if 
everyone is better off.   
  Second, it expresses only a pro tanto principle.  The Pareto principle is typically 
formulated as an all-things-considered principle, namely that alternative
41
 a
++
 is all-things-
considered morally better than alternative a
+
 if some are better with a
++
 than a
+
 and everyone is 
at least as well off, or alternatively (more weakly) if everyone is better off with a
++
 than a
+
.  But 
these all-things-considered principles can be accused of anthropocentrism: imagine that all 
persons are better off with a
++
, but a
+
 is massively worse for entities with moral significance that 
are not persons.  The all-things-considered principles can also be challenged for ignoring 
considerations of desert—a point stressed by Temkin,42 and implicit in Shelly Kagan‘s recent 
pathbreaking scholarship on desert.
43
  Imagine that everyone is better off with a
++
, but some 
receive more than they noncomparatively deserve, while in a
+
 everyone gets exactly what she 
noncomparatively deserves. Then a
++
 will be worse than a
+
 in light of noncomparative and 
perhaps also comparative desert,
 
and could be worse than a
+
 all things considered if desert has 
sufficient moral weight.
44 
 
  This is not to say that the all-thing-considered Pareto principles are wrong, just that they 
are controversial by virtue of their ambitious implication that the totality of Pareto-respecting 
moral considerations outweigh the totality of those that are not Pareto-respecting.  The Minimal 
Pareto Principle makes no such claim, since it concerns pro tanto (not all-things-considered) 
moral betterness in light of one moral factor, distributive justice.  And now note the third way in 
which the principle is weak: it builds in a responsibility requirement, stipulating that distributive 
justice favors the distribution that benefits everyone if everyone has been sufficiently prudent. 
                                                 
41
 ―Alternative‖ is meant to be generic, including outcomes, choices, or (as in this Article) distributions. 
42
 See ―Equality, Priority, and the Levelling Down Objection‖ 138-40. 
43
 Kagan, The Geometry of Desert. 
44
 The analysis here is not meant to endorse desert as a moral consideration separate from justice (Rawls famously 
denied that it was), but to be agnostic on the issue.  If desert is a separate such consideration, its relation to justice 
understood along responsibility-adjusted-welfarist lines is complex.  The features of  an individual‘s character and 
choices that ground her degree of responsibility, as opposed to her degree of desert, could well diverge. Thus the 
Minimal Pareto Principle (even modified to allow non-prudence bases for responsibility) might well favor a 
distribution worse in light of desert.  
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 The benefit-claim framework readily supports the Minimal Pareto Principle.    
Conceivably individuals who have been badly imprudent lack any claim in distributive justice 
that one distribution rather than a second obtain, even if they are affected by which does.  But 
we are considering a case in which everyone is not only better off in d
++
 than d
+
, but also 
sufficiently prudent.  Thus everyone has a benefit-claim valenced in favor of d
++
.  All the 
considerations on the table (parceled out among the justice population in the form of benefit-
claims) point in favor of d
++
; none point in favor of d
+
.  In such a case, the benefit-claim 
framework surely prefers the distribution that is universally favored.   The point of this 
justificatory framework (like any other) is to bring to light how various facts about the world 
and persons interrelate to constitute some aspect of moral rightness. If d
++
 and d
+
 are as 
specified by the Minimal Pareto Principle, all the factors identified by the framework as morally 
relevant—all the benefit-claims—point in one direction, towards d++.  How could d++ be 
anything but more just than d
+
?  
 By contrast, under the ―complaint‖ framework, d++ will be less just than d+ in many 
cases, and indeed in every case of the following kind:  Everyone is better off in d
++
 than d
+
 and 
sufficiently prudent (so the Minimal Pareto Principle favors d
++
) but (1) everyone is at the same 
well-being level in d
+
, while well-being is unequally distributed in d
++
; and (2) everyone is 
equally prudent.    Whatever the rule for identifying those with ―complaints‖ and measuring the 
complaints‘ strength, it must surely be the case that none have complaints in d+, and some have 
complaints in d
++
.   No one is at comparative fault, and no one is worse off than anyone else in 
d
+
, while some are worse off than others in d
++
.   And, whatever the rule for ranking two 
distributions in light of the pattern of complaints in each, surely d
++
 is less just (according to the 
―complaint‖ framework) than d+.   All the moral factors identified by that framework—all the 
―complaints‖—count against d++.  If d++ were to obtain, some would have cause for complaint 
in the Temkin sense; if d
+
 were to obtain, none would. 
 Thus the ―complaint‖ framework would rank distributions in conflict with the Minimal 
Pareto Principle; and for that reason, I suggest, we should reject the framework.   The Minimal 
Pareto Principle is extremely plausible.  The principle, it should be stressed, is not vulnerable to 
Temkin‘s challenge to the stronger and more familiar versions of the Pareto principle: namely, 
that alternatives which make everyone worse off might still be morally better, because they 
implicate impersonal moral values.
45
  While there may well be impersonal moral value in the 
flourishing of non-human animals, in giving persons what they morally deserve, in beauty 
rather than ugliness, or in creating persons who otherwise would not exist, distributive justice is  
a quintessentially personal moral consideration.  A distribution of goods is fair only if it 
respects the separateness of persons: only if it takes separate account of each persons‘ interests, 
concerns, goals, or values, and can be seen as justifiable on balance to  each individual, given 
her interests, concerns, goals, or values.  This insight, of course, goes back to Rawls; and the 
veil-of-ignorance framework, as well as Temkin‘s and Nagel‘s, are all attempts to structure 
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 See ―Equality, Priority, or What?‖ 77; ―Equality, Priority and the Levelling Down Objection.‖   
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distributive assessment so as to secure such respect. They are all (as it were) specific 
interpretations of the ―separateness of persons.‖  
 But if one alternative is better than a second in light of each person‘s interests, then it is 
justifiable to each, and the second justifiable to none.  Thus a concern for fair distribution 
favors the first alternative, whatever other moral factors and morality on balance might say.  It 
might be objected that ―respecting the separateness of persons‖ means attending to each 
person‘s goals, values, concerns, or something else about her other than her interests (well-
being). But the welfarist about distributive justice (responsibility adjusted or not) will hardly 
find this objection to be persuasive.  Welfarism about distributive justice just is the view that the 
right way to respect each person is to attend to her interests, and thus that the pattern of 
individuals‘ well-being is what determines how well justice has been achieved.    
 The argument here for the Minimal Pareto Principle is, therefore, an argument within 
welfarism about distributive justice.  In that sense, the argument is modest; the principle (even 
though minimal) may well be harder to argue for if some non-welfarist currency is adopted. 
Still, the argument reaches a non-trivial, even surprising conclusion.
46
 The within-distribution 
view of claims turns out to be a failed interpretation of the separateness of persons, given the 
welfarist view about which aspect of a person (on that view, her well-being) demands 
consideration. 
 Finally, a word might be said about how this argument relates to the literature on 
―leveling down.‖47  Plausible principles of distributive justice will involve a preference for 
equalization of the goods (whether welfare or something else) covered by those principles.  But 
it is possible (whether or not plausible) that equality is also one of the impersonal moral values.  
It may be better ―from the point of view of the universe‖ for a more rather than less equal 
pattern of well-being, or something else, to obtain. If so, ―leveling down‖—making everyone 
worse off so as to reduce inequality—will be morally better pro tanto, in light of that value, and 
perhaps all-things-considered.  But distributive justice does not counsel leveling down, or so I 
have argued.  If there is moral value in pursuing equality by leveling down, then that value is 
separate from distributive justice. 
IV. Prioritarianism 
 Prioritarianism, often, is understood a kind of welfare-consequentialism, namely an 
account of the moral ranking of outcomes as determined by the well-being of individuals 
therein.   But what are the axiomatic features of this ranking? It seems clear that prioritarians 
understand it to satisfy the Pigou-Dalton principle for outcomes, namely:  
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 Temkin, surely, would be surprised, since he articulates the ―complaint‖ framework in Inequality using 
differences in well-being as the basis for individuals‘ complaints. 
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 See scholarship cited in Adler, Well-Being and Fair Distribution, 337, n. 53. 
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PD Principle for Outcomes:   If High is better off than Low in outcome x, and at least as 
well off as Low in outcome y; High is better off in x than y, Low in y than x, with the 
difference in High‘s well-being between x and y exactly equal to the difference in Low‘s 
well-being between y and x; and everyone else is equally well off in the two outcomes, 
then: y is a morally better outcome than x.  
For example, in the canonical statement of prioritarianism, Parfit writes: ―[b]enefitting people 
matters more the worse off these people are‖; that well-being has ―diminishing marginal moral 
importance‖; and that: ―For Utilitarians, the moral importance of each benefit depends only on 
how great the benefit would be. For Prioritarians, it also depends on how well off the person is 
to whom this benefit comes. We should not give equal weight to equal benefits, whoever 
receives them. Benefits to the worse off should be given more weight.‖48  All these formulations 
(in the context of morally ranking outcomes) point to the PD principle for outcomes.   
  However, Parfit also stresses that prioritarians are not concerned with ―relativities.‖  The 
moral weight of a change to someone‘s well-being does not depend upon how her level of well-
being compares with others. 
People at higher altitudes find it harder to breathe.  Is this because they are higher up than other people?  In 
one sense, yes.  But they would find it just as hard to breathe even if there were no other people lower 
down.  In the same way, on the Priority View, benefits to the worse off matter more, but that is only 
because these people are at a lower absolute level. It is irrelevant that these people are worse off than 
others.  Benefits to them would matter just as much even if there were not others who were better off. 
The chief difference, then, is this.  Egalitarians are concerned with relativities: with how each person‘s 
level compares with the level of other people.  On the Priority View, we are concerned only with people‘s 
absolute levels.
49  
  If prioritarianism does indeed have the feature that the moral weight of a change to 
someone‘s well-being is independent of how her well-being compares with others, then the 
prioritarian ranking of outcomes should surely satisfy an axiom of ―separability.‖ 
Separability for Outcomes:  The moral ranking of two outcomes is independent of the 
well-being levels of unaffected individuals (those who are equally well off in the two 
outcomes). 
Assume that there are A individuals not equally well off in x and y; and U unaffected individuals. 
Each of the affected individuals has some well-being level in x, and a different level in y.   The 
prioritarian ranks x and y by assigning each such welfare difference a moral value—a value that 
is just a function of the individual‘s levels in the two outcomes, and not of how her well-being 
compares to others.  And the comparison of x and y then depends upon these A moral values.  
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 Parfit, ―Equality or Priority,‖ 101, 105. 
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What those A values are, and how x and y compare in light of them, has nothing to do with what 
the well-being levels of the U unaffected individuals happen to be. 
 In short, separability seems to be one of the axioms for ranking outcomes that 
prioritarians should endorse, in virtue of what they have said about the non-relativistic nature of 
prioritarianism. Indeed, in the literature on social choice, prioritarianism is almost always 
expressed as a social welfare function that satisfies both the PD principle for outcomes and 
separability.
50
 
 What is the logical connection between the PD principle for outcomes and separability?  
None.  A moral ranking of outcomes can satisfy the PD principle but not separability; satisfy 
separability but not the PD principle; both; or neither. The last three cases are illustrated in the 
margin.
51
 The most important case, for our purposes, is the first. Consider the ―rank-weighted‖ 
rule for ordering outcomes.   With N individuals in the population, N different fixed positive 
weights are specified, w1 > w2 ….> wN > 0.   A given outcome is assigned a number, equaling the 
well-being level of the lowest-ranked (i.e., worst-off) individual multiplied by w1, plus the well-
being level of the second-worst-off individual multiplied by w2, … plus the well-being level of 
the best-off individual multiplied by wN.
52
  Outcomes are then ordered according to these sums.  
 The rank-weighted approach satisfies the PD principle for outcomes. This is obvious in 
the scenario where the transfer does not cause anyone to change ranks.  For example, imagine 
that there are three individuals, Jim, Ken, and Larry.   In outcome x, their well-being levels are, 
respectively, 20, 50, and 200, assigned a numerical value of 20w1 + 50w2 + 200w3.  A PD 
transfer occurs, transferring 15 units from Larry to Ken.  The numerical value assigned to this 
new outcome is 20w1 + (50+15)w2 + (200-15)w3.   Since w2 > w3, this numerical value must be 
greater than the numerical value assigned to x.   
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 For a demonstration that the rank-weighted approach satisfies the PD principle for 
outcomes in general (even when transfers cause rank-switches), see the Appendix. 
 However, the rank-weighted approach violates separability.  The moral weight of 
someone‘s well-being difference as between two outcomes depends upon his well-being rank in 
the entire population—not just the two levels taken alone.    To illustrate, let outcome y be such 
that Jim still has 20—so he is unaffected—but Ken has 60, and Larry 175.  Thus while x is 
assigned a numerical value of 20w1 + 50w2 + 200w3, y is assigned a value of 20w1 + 60w2 + 
175w3.  The difference between these values is w2(60-50) + w3(175-200). 
 Now consider two outcomes x
+
 and y
+
 which are identical to x and y, respectively, except 
that the unaffected person (Jim) is at a different level of well-being.  He remains unaffected 
between x
+
 and y
+
, but his position in the population pattern of well-being is different.  For 
example, x
+
 is such that Jim has 100, Ken 50, and Larry 200, while y
+
 is such that Jim has 100, 
Ken 60, and Larry 175.  The rank-weighted approach assigns x
+
 a value of w2(100) + w1(50) + w3 
(200), and y
+
 a value of w2 (100) + w1(60) + w3(175).   The difference between these values is 
w1(60-50) + w3(175-200).   Note that this numerical difference could be positive while the 
numerical difference between y and x negative—since w1 > w2.  A violation of separability can 
occur because in the x
+
/y
+
 comparison, Ken‘s well-being difference is multiplied by w1 (he is the 
lowest ranked in both of these outcomes), while in the x/y comparison it is multiplied by w2 (he 
is the second-lowest-ranked). 
  The rank-weighted approach to ranking outcomes is a PD-respecting approach, but 
violates separability, and thus is not a prioritarian approach.  Now, self-described ―prioritarians‖ 
might object that I have mischaracterized their commitments.  This is an interpretive question 
which need not be belabored here. The key observation is that nothing in the logic of rankings 
requires the combination of separability and the PD principle.  A substantive argument is needed 
to show why we should endorse this combination—rather than the PD principle without 
separability—as part of the criterion for ranking outcomes. 
 Let us turn now to justice.  Recall that we are focusing throughout on principles for 
ordering subsets of distributions with fixed prudence.  Within any such subset, what varies about 
individuals (if anything does) is their well-being; and separability for distributions (for short, 
―separability‖) is straightforwardly definable by direct transposition from the outcome case. 
Separability for Distributions:  The justice ranking of two distributions does not depend 
upon the well-being levels of unaffected individuals.  
Once more, we need a substantive argument for coupling this principle with the PD principle (for 
distributions). Does the benefit-claim framework furnish such an argument? 
 I believe it does, but I also believe that this argument is not nearly as straightforward as 
the argument for the PD principle itself.  Recall the structure of the argument for the PD 
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principle: the facts about High‘s and Low‘s levels furnish a pro tanto reason for the distribution 
(d
*
) better for Low; and that consideration is not overridden by any other.  Notably, this 
argument conceded the possibility that the strength of an affected person‘s benefit-claim might 
depend not only upon her well-being and responsibility levels in the two distributions, but also 
upon the well-being levels of everyone else in the population.  Even if well-being rank were a 
factor influencing the strength of someone‘s benefit-claim, that factor (so I argued) simply 
reinforced Low‘s claim at the expense of High‘s.   
 By contrast, the argument from the benefit-claim framework to separability must show 
that the methodology for assigning strength to a non-zero claim cannot make reference to the 
claimant‘s well-being rank in the distributions being compared, or otherwise take account of the 
well-being levels of unaffected individuals.  But why not?  Do not be misled by the ―across-
distribution‖ architecture of benefit claims. Such a claim (by contrast with a Temkin 
―complaint‖) is a relation between an individual and two distributions; but its strength can 
depend upon any facts about the two distributions, including how her well-being compares to 
others‘ in each of the two. 
 For example, consider the following rule (fragment)
53
 for assigning strength to benefit 
claims.  If the two distributions being compared are such that each individual‘s rank in the 
population distribution of well-being does not vary between the two, let the strength of each 
affected person‘s claim (in favor of the distribution where she is better off) be 1 multiplied by 
her well-being difference if she has the highest level of well-being, 2 multiplied by her well-
being difference if she has the second-highest level, etc; and then sum these weighted claims to 
compare the distributions.  This can yield a violation of separability, as the following example 
shows: d is preferred to d* but d
++
 to d
+
, because shifting the level of well-being of unaffected 
Jim shifts Ken‘s rank from second-highest to third-highest, and thus changes the strength of 
Ken‘s benefit-claim. 
      Jim Ken Larry     
  Distribution d   20 50 200  
  Distribution d*  20 60 175 
  Strength of benefit-claim 0 2(10) 1(25)  
 Distribution d
+
  100 50 200 
Distribution d
++
  100 60 175 
Strength of benefit-claim 0 3(10) 1(25) 
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claim framework might violate separability, it suffices to show that a rule-fragment of the sort here described would 
do so.  
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 In short, it is the PD principle (together with the Minimal Pareto principle) that 
responsibility sensitive welfarists should see as the core of justice. While a plausible and, I 
believe, persuasive case can be made for ―prioritarianism‖ about justice—for adding 
separability—that case is certainly less compelling than the case for the PD and Minimal Pareto 
principles.  These are the twin pillars of justice.    
V. Appendix 
 This Appendix explains why the rank-weighted approach to ordering outcomes satisfies 
the PD principle for outcomes (see above Part IV). 
 Let u(x) = (u1(x), u2(x) …, uN(x)) be a list of each person‘s well-being in outcome x, with 
u1 the well-being of person 1 in x and so forth.   Let ũ be a permutation (rearrangement) of the 
entries in u(x), with ũ1(x) the first entry, and which is ―rank ordered,‖ i.e., ũ1(x) ≤ ũ2(x) ≤  . . . ≤ 
ũN(x).  The rank-weighted approach to ordering outcomes uses fixed positive weights w1 > w2 
….> wN > 0, and assigns x a value r(x) equaling: w1ũ
1
(x) + w2ũ
2
(x) + … + wNũ
N
(x).  Outcomes 
are then ordered according to the rule: x is morally at least as good as y iff r(x) ≥ r(y). 
 Assume that y is reached from x via a PD transfer from individual h(igh) to individual 
l(ow).  That is, ∆ > 0; ul(x) < ul(y) = ul(x) + ∆ ≤ uh(y) = uh(x) − ∆; and for all k ≠ h, l, uk(x) = 
uk(y).  Let us say that y and x are ―rank consistent‖ (in the case of a PD transfer) if there is no k 
such that uk(x) > ul(x) but uk(y) < ul(y) and no k such that uk(x) < uh(x) but uk(y) > uh(y). 
 It is easy to see that the rank-weighed rule gives a higher value to y over x if the 
outcomes are rank consistent.   Note that this is clearly true even if individual l, or h, or both 
starts out or ends up at a level equal to some other person.   For example, if the well-being levels 
in x are (1, 2, 6, 13, 17), and the individual at level 17 moves to 13, while the individual at level 
2 moves to 6—resulting in well-being levels in y of (1, 6, 6, 13, 13)—the value r(x) is w1(1) + 
w2(2) + w3(6) + w4(13) + w5(17).   The value r(y) is  w1(1) + w2(6) + w3(6) + w4(13) + w5(13).   
Since w5 < w2, r(y) > r(x). 
 If y and x are not rank-consistent, we can create a series of rank-consistent PD transfers 
from x to m to m* to … to y, such that each outcome in this series is assigned a lower r(.) value 
than the next, and thus (by the transitivity of the real numbers) r(x) must be less than r(y).   For 
example, imagine that x as before has the well-being values (1, 2, 6, 13, 17), and there is a 
transfer of 6 units from the last individual to the first—so that y has the values (7, 2, 6, 13, 11).  
Let m be (2, 2, 6, 13, 16); m* (5, 2, 6, 13, 13); and m** (6, 2, 6, 13, 12).  Then x to m, m to m*, 
m* to m**, and m** to y are each rank-consistent PD transfers. 
 To construct a general rule for doing this, assume that there are K individuals who are 
strictly better off than l in x but worse off than her in y; and M individuals who are strictly worse 
off than h in x but better off than her in y.  Denote the well-being levels of the K individuals as 
R1, …, RK and the well-being levels of the M individuals as S1, …, SM.  Let ul be the well-being 
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level of individual l in x, uh the level of individual h in x, and ul + ∆ and uh − ∆, respectively, 
their levels in y.  
 Let ∆1 be the minimum positive value in the set of numbers {R1 – ul, R2 – ul, …, RK – ul, 
uh – S1, uh – S2, …, uh – SM}.  Let ∆2 be the minimum positive value in the set of numbers {R1 – 
(ul + ∆1), R2 – (ul + ∆1),…, RK – (ul +∆1), (uh − ∆1) –S1, (uh – ∆1) – S2,…, (uh −∆1) – SM}.   Let ∆3 
be the minimum positive value in the set of numbers {R1 – (ul + ∆1 + ∆2), R2 – (ul + ∆1 + ∆2 ),…, 
RK – (ul +∆1 + ∆2), (uh − ∆1 − ∆2) –S1, (uh – ∆1 − ∆2) – S2,…, (uh −∆1 − ∆2) – SM}.  Repeat this 
process, recursively, until a ∆T is reached such that no positive ∆T+1 exists. 
 Now consider the series of T outcomes m1, …, mT such that individual l in outcome mt 
has well-being level ul + ∆1 + ∆2 + … + ∆t, while individual h has well-being level uh − ∆1 − ∆2 − 
… − ∆t (while all other individuals have their well-being levels in x, equaling their levels in y).   
By construction, each outcome in the series x, m1, …, mT, y is reached via a rank-consistent PD 
transfer from the one before.  
 Note: it can also be proved by algebraic manipulation that the rank-weighted approach 
satisfies the PD principle; but this method of decomposing any PD transfer into a series of rank-
consistent PD transfers shows, quite intuitively, why that is the case. 
